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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants in 1976 borrowed $108,000 from 
respondent to purchase an apartment complex. In order to 
obtain the loan, appellants agreed that if they sold any 
interest in this investment property either the loan balance 
would become immediately due and payable or the new buyers 
would assume the loan at a higher rate of interest. In 1979, 
however, appellants secretively sold the property and deli-
berately tried to conceal the sale from respondent. In 1980, 
after respondent discovered the sale, appellants failed to 
pay the loan balance or to have the new buyers assume the 
loan. Appellants filed the present action to attempt to pre-
vent foreclosure. The lower court granted summary judgment 
in favor of respondent, concluding that "the 'due-on-sale' 
clause before the court is not an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation within the meaning of Utah law," and that it is "a 
legal, valid, and enforceable contract provision." 
Appellants have appealed that decision to this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 18, 1976, Stanley and Sheila Redd, 
sterling and Jill Redd, and Paul and Donna Dutson (herein-
after referred to as "appellants") borrowed $108,000 from 
respondent Western Savings & Loan Company (Western Savings) 
(R. 22) to purchase a twenty-four ( 24) unit apartment comple 
as an investment. (R. 11 O.) In connection with the financ-
ing of this investment property, appellants executed a Trust 
Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a separate document entitled 
"Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration Clauses." (R. 
22-25, 31, 33, 110.) The relevant portions of these instru-
ments are set out below. 
Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed (R. 25),the 
so-called "due-on-sale" provision, required the appellants t 
notify Western Savings if they transferred the property, 
whether by contract or otherwise, and the provision gave 
Western Savings the election to accelerate the note or 
increase the interest rate of the note: 
29. [Appellants agree] to notify [Western 
Savings] in writing should said property or any 
interest therein be conveyed, transferred or 
assigned, whether by deed, contract of sale, .. 
or otherwise, • • . . Should said property or any 
interest therein be so conveyed, ..• all indebt-
edness secured hereby shall forthwith, without 
notice, become due and payable at the election of 
[Western Savings] ... and should [Western 
Savings] not so elect and the person who acquires 
said property or any interest therein assumes the 
indebtedness evidenced by the note secured hereby, 
[appellants consent] . to the reduction or 
increase of the interest rate thereof. (Emphasis 
added.) 
-2-
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The Trust Deed Note (R. 33) provided that if 
any of the terms of the Trust Deed were violated, including 
failure to notify Western Savings of any transfer of the 
property as required by Paragraph 29, supra, the principal 
balance of the note could be accelerated: 
If default occurs in the payment of said 
installments of principal and interest or any part 
thereof, or in the performance of any agreement 
contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the 
holder hereof, at its option and without notice or 
demand, ~ay declare the entire principal balance and 
accrued interest due and payable. (Emphasis added.) 
The appellants' attention was directed specifi-
cally to Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed and they understood 
the consequences of violating its terms, as evidenced by 
their endorsement of the "Acknowledgment of Trust Deed 
Acceleration Clauses," (R. 31) which provided: 
In connection with the making of this Trust Deed 
loan, we, the undersigned borrowers, acknowledge 
that our attention has been called to paragraphs 29 
and 30 of the Trust Deed, which can result in 
acceleration of this note in the event of any of 
the occurrences as set forth in those paragraphs. 
Although appellants recognized and understood 
the terms of the financing documents at issue in this case, 
they nevertheless deliberately breached their obligations 
under those documents. On or about September 25, 1979, in 
direct violation of the Trust Deed, they sold their interest 
in their investment property by contract sale without inform-
ing Western Savings of that transfer. (R. 3, 111.) It was 
only when Western Savings determined that the monthly Trust 
Note payments were being made by Escrow Services, Inc., 
-3-
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(Escrow Services) that Western Savings investigated and 
discovered that the property had been transferred. To date, 
Escrow Services has continued to proffer monthly payments 
which Western Savings has refused to accept so as not to wo~ 
a waiver of its contractual rights. ( R. 38, 40, 111.) 
After learning that the apartment complex had in 
fact been transferred, Western Savings offered to allow the 
new buyers to assume the appellants' indebtedness at an 
increased interest rate. (R. 21, 111.) The new buyers, 
however, failed to submit the necessary loan application 
forms. (R. 28.) Accordingly, because appellants secretivel: 
breached their contractual obligations and continued to 
violate the terms of their financing agreement, even after 
discovery, Western Savings relied on its contractual rights 
to accelerate the remaining balance. When appellants fail~ 
to pay the principal due, Western Savings began foreclosure 
proceedings. 
For more than three and one-half years, appellants 
failed to complain to Western Savings or otherwise challenge 
Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed. Although appellants could 
have borrowed money for their investment property from other 
lending institutions, and at different terms, they accepted 
the terms offered by Western Savings. Western Savings reliec 
on those terms in agreeing to lend money to the appellants. 
Appellants, however, on May 19, 1980, after violating the 
terms of the loan agreement, filed a col'lplaint seeking: ( l! 
declaratory judgment that Western Savings did not have the 
-4-
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right to enforce the express and clear terms of the Trust 
Deed agreement; (2) an injunction against the acceleration of 
the indebtedness and foreclosure proceedings, although both 
were part of the agreed terms of the Trust Deed; and (3) 
"damages" allegedly resulting from Western Savings' reliance 
on the terms of the Trust Deed. ( R. 2-8.) 
Arguments based upon the undisputed facts were 
heard on July 10, 1980, and the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
rendered summary judgment in favor of Western Savings: 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The pleadings, affidavits and exhibits before 
the court show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Based upon the above 
findings and conclusions and for good cause appear-
ing, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiffs' complaint is dismis-
sed with prejudice and all parties are to bear 
their own costs. (R. 113.) 
By this appeal, appellants seek to avoid the 
obligations to which they agreed, simply because those 
obligations ceased to be economically beneficial to them. 
For the reasons stated herein, the appellants' appeal must be 
rejected and the decision of the lower court affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WESTERN SAVINGS HAS THE CONTRACTUAL, 
EQUITABLE, AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
INCREASE THE INTEREST RATE OF THE 
TRUST NOTE AS CONSIDERATION FOR ITS 
CONSENT TO THE TRANSFER OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND ITS WAIVER OF THE DUE-ON-
SALE CLAUSE. 
The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note specifically 
authorized Western Savings to accelerate the indebtedness or 
-5-
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increase the interest rate of the Trust Note if the 
appellants conveyed the property by contract. The appellant 
recognize this and, therefore, now argue that the due-on-sa~­
clause of the Trust Deed is an unreasonable restraint on the 
alienation of property. Such an argument is invalid for 
three reasons: ( 1) increasing the interest rate to the new 
buyer on the remaining indebtedness to more closely reflect 
current interest rates, in lieu of accelerating the origin~ 
borrower's indebtedness, is not a restraint on alienation; 
(2) such a practice is reasonable; (3) such a practice is 
equitable; and (4) the Utah Legislature has authorized 
state-chartered savings and loan associations, such as 
Western Savings, to exercise its options under the 
due-on-sale clause. 
A. Western Savings' Exercise Of Its Rights Under 
The Due-On-Sale Clause Is Not A Restraint On Alienation. 
Appellants argue that the due-on-sale clause 
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on their ability to 
convey their apartment complex. While they make various 
arguments in support of this proposition, it is important ~ 
realize why appellants do so. The simple fact is that, if 
the new buyers assume the loan at an increased interest rate 
the appellants will receive less money than they prefer to 
receive. Therefore, appellants desire the new buyers to 
obtain the benefit of the low (by today's standards) 9-5/8! 
interest rate on the existing loan. 
A contractual provision in a loan agreement which 
merely affects the asking price the seller may pr~fer to 
-6-
Sponsor d by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by th  Institut  of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
receive for his property but does not restrain the actual 
transfer of the property is not a restraint on alienation: 
In practical terms [these provisions] merely 
[affect] the vendor-mortgagor's total asking price 
for his property. A higher interest rate will 
probably cause the vendor-mortgagor to lower his 
sales price in order to compete price wise with 
similar property . . . thus the vendor-mortgagor's 
ability to command his preferred asking price might 
be somewhat impaired. Nevertheless, the increased 
interest provision does not restrain the actual 
transfer of the property because there is no 
constraint on the vendor-mortgagor's freedom to 
alienate his property. 
Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion, 545 P.2d 546, 548-59 (Wash. 1976) (citations omitted); 
see also, Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); 
Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer Clauses, 13 Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Journal 891 (1978). 
Appellants' attempt to characterize a due-on-sale 
clause as a "restraint on alienation" tortures that concept 
as it has heretofore been understood. This was recognized in 
a recent state court decision interpreting the due-on-sale 
clause: 
The Restatement of Property§ 404 (1944) defines a 
restraint on alienation as follows: 
(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is 
used in this Restatement, is an attempt by an otherwise 
effective conveyance or contract to cause a later con-
veyance 
(a) to be void; or . . . (b) to impose contractual 11ab1l1ty on the one 
who makes the later conveyance when such liability 
results from a breach of an agreement not to 
convey; or . ( c) to terminate or subJect to termination all 
or a part of the property interest conveyed. 
-7-
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(2) If a restraint on alienation is of the type 
described in Subsection (1), Clause (a), it is a 
disabling restraint. 
( 3) If a restraint on alienation is of the type 
described in Subsection ( 1 ) , Clause ( b), it is a 
promissory restraint. 
(4) If a restraint on alienation is of the type 
described in Subsection ( 1), Clause ( c), it is a 
forfeiture restraint. 
One need simply read the various subparts of § 40; 
to conclude that a "due on sale" clause does not, in a•, 
manner, bring about any of the effects noted there a~· 
cannot, therefore, be a direct restraint on alienation. 
The questioned clause in no manner precludes the 
owner-mortgagor from conveying his property. The owner 
is free to convey without legal restraint and the 
con1eyance does not cause a forfeiture of the title, bu: 
only an acceleration of the debt. 
It is true that the possibility of acceleration ma 
impede the ability of an owner to sell his property as· 
he wishes [the basis of the court's decision in Tucker 
v. Larsen, 526 P.2d 1169 (Cal. 1974), a case heavrry--
relied upon by appellants); nonetheless, not every 
impediment to a sale is a restraint on alienation, let 
alone contrary to public policy. It is a fact that 
zoning restrictions, building restrictions, or public 
improvements may impede the sale and substantially 
affect the ability of an owner to realize a maximum 
price. Yet no one suggests that such restrictions or 
convenants, as a class, are invalid simply because the;· 
affect the ease with which one may dispose of one's 
property. We are somewhat at a loss to understand how 
or why so many courts have been willing to describe a 
"due on sale" clause as a restraint on alienation and~ 
are unwilling to do so. 
Occidental Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d 843, 
845 (Neb. 1980). (Emphasis added.) See also, Enforcemento: 
Due-On-Transfer Clauses, supra, at 898, 916, 926. 
Requiring the appellants' new buyers to assume t~ 
loan at an increased interest rate does not prohibit appel-
lants from transferring their property; it only lowers the 
price appellants will receive for their apartment complex. 
-8-
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Therefore, this case does not involve a "restraint on aliena-
tion." 
B. Enforcement Of The Due-On-Sale Clause Is 
Reasonable. 
Appellants correctly note that one of the purposes 
of the due-on-sale clause is to preserve and protect the 
lender's security and avoid having to resort to that security 
to obtain payments. However, that is not the only reason for 
the due-on-sale clause. There are additional purposes for 
these provisions which the majority of courts have recognized 
as being justified. Specifically, the due-on-sale clause 
permits lending institutions, including Western Savings, to 
adjust their loan portfolio toward current market rates and 
insure that mortgages and trust notes are saleable on the 
secondary mortgage market. See, Occidental Savings & Loan 
Ass'n. v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d at 849; Century Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass'n of Bridgeton v. Van Glahn, 364 A.2d 558, 562 
(N.J. 1976). 
The necessity, fairness and, therefore, the 
reasonableness of the due-on-sale clause have been recognized 
by the majority of courts considering this question, 
particularly in these times of double-digit inflation and 
widely fluctuating interest rates. See, Occidental Savings & 
Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 293 N.W.2d 843 (Neb. 1980); Tierce v. 
APS Co., 382 So.2d 485 (Ala. 1980); Miller v. Pacific First 
Federal savings & Loan Ass'n., 545 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1976); 
Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 224 S.E.2d 
-9-
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580 (N.C. 1976); Century Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. V~ 
----
Glahn, 62 Misc.2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Malouff v. 
Midland Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 
1973); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Mutual 
-
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 205 
N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 1973); Peoples Savings Ass'n v. Standard 
Industries, Inc., 257 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio 1970); Stith v. Hudso· 
City Savings Institution, 63 Misc.2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 
( 1970). 
1. The due-on-sale clause is necessary to set 
fair and reasonable interest rates on mortgages and trust 
deed notes. 
One important factor that any lender considers 
in setting the interest rate of a loan is the period of time 
the loan will be outstanding. Obviously, the longer the tLr· 
period, the greater risk the lender assumes that he may n~ 
realize a reasonable return on his money because of infla-
tion, catastrophe, the uncredi tworthiness of the borrowers, 
etc. This basic principle is equally applicable to the ~r~ 
gage loan industry. Properties subject to mortgages are 
sold, on the average, about every ten to twelve years. See, 
U.S. League of Savings Associations, Mortgage Portfolio 
Management (1978) at 127. Therefore, when Western Savings 
makes its loans, it knows that, on the average, the interes» 
rates on the loans will be updated toward current market 
levels within ten to twelve years, even though the loans 
themselves are written for a thirty-year period. Therefore, 
-10-
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western Savings in effect sets the interest rates on its 
loans to account for a ten to twelve-year risk period. 
Given the present economic conditions, a judicial 
holding that the due-on-sale clause is unenforceable would 
effectively lock Western Savings and similar lenders into low 
rates of return for thirty years, even though interest rates 
initially were set on the assumption that they would be 
adjusted upward to current levels at least two or three times 
during the 30-year period of the loan. 
Appellants contend that raising the interest rates 
to meet the projected economic risks of inflation is not a 
reasonable purpose of the due-on-sale clause, relying heavily 
upon Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 
P.2d 970 ( 1978). In that case, the court wrongly assumed 
that lenders did not correctly project future economic 
conditions, i.e., they did not anticipate the recent high 
inflation and interest rates and, therefore, it would be 
"unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic 
projections on property owners .•.. " Id. at 976. 
Simply put, the Wellenkamp decision is not sup-
ported by the facts of the case, by economic principle or by 
logic. Contrary to the Wel1enkamp decision, lenders made no 
errors in projecting future ecJnomic conditions. The error 
they made was in projecting future judicial decisions. 
Lenders knew that the interest rates they gave to borrowers 
would account for risks incurred over an average ten to 
twelve-year period. What they failed to foresee was that the 
-11-
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California Supreme Court would hold that the interest rates 
set for that ten to twelve-year risk period would have to 
compensate lenders for risks incurred over thirty years. In 
short, the California court made an independent, 
after-the-fact business judgment about how interest rates 
should be set, and this judgment changed the mortgage loan 
industry in California. 
Obviously, if a lender had known that the interes• 
rate on a loan to the appellants could not be increased by 
reason of the exercise of the due-on-sale clause, the 
lender's economic projections would have been forecast on t:,, 
basis of a thirty-year period rather than a ten or 
twelve-year period. The interest rate the appellants 
received thus would have been higher at the outset. There-
fore, by receiving the interest rate of only 9-5/8%, 
appellants already have benefitted from their loan terms. 
Further allowing them to lock up that interest rate for up t: 
thirty years after they sell their property to someone el~, 
unfairly permits them to transfer their low interest loan ~ 
the new buyers and thereby receive an unbargained-for wind-
fall profit at the expense of lenders and all other new 
buyers who are not lucky enough to assume existing mortgage 
loans. See generally, Enforcement of Due-On-Transfer 
Clauses, supra, at 930. 
If lenders are forced tempor ar i 1 y to absorb losses 
caused by a judicial decision that they cannot enforce 
due-on-sale clauses, they will have to recover from future 
-12-
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customers the unrealized anticipated revenues. 1 This will 
be necessary in order to cover losses sustained by carry-
ing low interest rate mortgages as well as to cover future 
risks which the lender will have to bear beyond the usual ten 
to twelve-year period. The only way additional revenue can 
be generated is by charging higher rates to new customers on 
conventional mortgages, by instituting variable rate mort-
gages which reflect current interest rates, by making short-
term loans amortized over shorter periods which would require 
all purchasers to refinance their loans more often, or by 
ceasing to make new loans and go to the second-mortgage mar-
ket. Under any of these alternatives, a borrower's monthly 
lsavings and loan associations, including western 
Savings, recently have been put into a serious earnings 
crunch with the substantial rise in interest rates during the 
past two years. Many will have a net operating loss for 
1980. To attract depositors, they have had to offer 
unprecedentedly high rates of interest on their passbook 
accounts, certificates of deposit and money market 
certificates. Without these deposits, the lending 
institutions would be unable to maintain minimum reserves on 
which to borrow additional funds which in turn are lent to 
prospective home purchasers. 
Because savings and loan associations "borrow short and 
lend long," they are squeezed during periods of rising 
interest rates: they have to pay extremely high interest on 
short-term accounts, by using income from relatively low-
interest long-term loans. This problem arises because the 
vast majority of the loans which a lender holds in its 
portfolio was made before the steep rise in interest rates. 
Consequently, savings and loan associations are forced to pay 
high-interest short-term accounts from low-interest long-term 
mortgage loans. The only way these lenders ca~ continue ~o 
make loans and meet expenses is to raise the yield of their 
loan portfolio. If they are prevented from raising the rates 
on previous loans, e.g., by using the due-on-sale clause, 
then they will have to raise rates dramatically on future 
loans. 
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payments will be higher, thus making it impossible for many 
otherwise qualified buyers to purchase property. See, 
Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
509 P.2d at 1244-45; Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victor·: 
__.. 
for the Consumer?, 31 Hastings L.J. 275, 293-97 (1979); 
'Flexibility in Housing Subsidies, No Variable Mortgages' -
Garn, The Salt Lake Tribune, November 28, 1980 at B-6. 
Lenders Pushing Second Mortgages to Ease Pinch of Long-Term 
Loans, The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 198 0 at 3 1 . In 
contrast to these alternatives, the reasonableness of the 
due-on-sale ~ortgage is apparent. Under this type of 
mortgage, the interest rate is fixed between the lender and 
his original borrower. The original borrower is able to 
retain the advantage of his original interest rate for as 
long as he has the loan, even though current interest rates 
may have risen substantially. If the original borrower sell' 
the property during the life of the loan, the new buyer is 
then able to assume the loan at least at the current interes: 
rate and probably at a slightly lower rate than the market 
rate. Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 509 P.2d at 1245. 
Appellants' brief attempts to demean the beneficia: 
aspects of the due-on-sale clause by mischaracterizing 
Western Savings' argument before the lower court. Western 
Savings has never argued that an adverse "decision will brine 
the mortgage loan industry to its knees" or that "financial 
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chaos has fallen upon the states who have rejected (the argu-
ments presented herein.]" Appellants' Brief at 28. 
Lending institutions will continue to make loans to 
enable borrowers to purchase homes and investment properties. 
They will in fact incur some losses if they are not allowed 
to rely upon the due-on-sale clause, but as demonstrated 
above the primary adverse impact will be upon borrowers 
seeking new loans. They will be forced to accept one of the 
alternatives to conventional mortgages, and they will bear 
all the attendant disadvantages. 
Appellants rely heavily upon California precedent. 
Since Wellenkamp, however, California lenders have found new 
ways to alleviate the bind in which that decision placed 
them. They have instituted many of the alternative loans 
described above, and the adverse impact on prospective 
borrowers has been real. See, ~, Wellenkamp v. Bank of 
America: A Victory for the Consumer?, 31 Hastings L.J. 275 
( 1979). 
The question before this Court is who will bear the 
burden of increased interest rates brought on by inflation? 
The appellants seek to shift that burden from existing 
borrowers who already have realized inflationary gains in the 
value of their property to lending institutions, including 
Western Savings, and to those new borrowers who want to 
purchase homes but who may be unable to afford the higher 
payments resulting from that shift. 
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Such a result should not be allowed. The issue of 
who is to bear the burden of increased rates was decided 
previously by the appellants themselves when they agreed that 
Western Savings could either accelerate their loan if the 
apartment complex was conveyed by con tract of sale or 
increase the interest rate of that loan if it were to be 
assumed. This resolution of the issue was approved in 
Gunther, 489 S.W.2d at 532, when the court stated: 
~The lender under its contract had] the right to 
insist upon the repayment of their loan in the event of 
sale, so that they can re lend the money at an increased 
interest rate, and so maintain their supply of lending 
money, at the level of the present cost of such money. 
In this situation, equity should not depart from the la'• 
which requires it to enforce valid contracts and strike 
down the acceleration options simply because its 
exercise will let the [lenders], not the [borrowers] 
make the profit on the interest rate occasioned by the 
increased cost of money. 
This resolution similarly should be approved by this 
Court. 
2. The due-on-sale clause is necessary to 
obtain adequate secondary mortgage market funding. 
Besides having an adverse impact on borrowers 
seeking new loans, elimination of the due-on-sale clause 
would reduce the number of loans that could be made. The 
amount of mortgage money which Utah savings and loan 
associations, including Western Savings, receive from their 
depositors is far less than the amount they lend out. They 
are able to lend additional money because of their ability to 
sell their financing instruments to investors in the 
secondary mortgage market outside the state. 
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These secondary mortgage market investors, as did 
western Savings, anticipated that mortgage loan interest 
rates would be adjusted every ten to twelve years. If they 
do not receive that readjustment through enforcement of the 
due-on-sale clause, they either will refuse to purchase Utah 
mortgages or else will require a higher rate of interest on 
new loans to compensate for the increased risk of holding the 
mortgages for longer periods. Therefore, without enforceable 
due-on-sale clauses, to sell trust notes and mortgages on the 
secondary market, Utah lenders will be required to charge new 
borrowers substantially higher interest rates, thereby 
decreasing the number of loans that will be made. 
In contrast, the reasonableness of the due-on-sale 
loan agreements is apparent, because through their use Utah 
lenders are able to obtain funds from the secondary market, 
thereby enabling more people to purchase homes at lower 
rates. 
As demonstrated, infra, appellants fail to address 
fairly the adverse economic impacts which will result if this 
Court strikes down the due-on-sale clause. 
The Federal National Mortgage Association {"Fannie 
Mae"), the major purchaser of mortgage loans, announced that 
beginning with loans written October 1, 1980, those new 
buyers seeking to assume existing loans will be unable to do 
so unless they pass a credit check and agree to accept 
prevailing market interest rates. See, Fannie Mae to Require 
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Prevailing Rates, Credit Checks on Mortgage Assumptions, T~ 
wall Street Journal, August 11, 1980, at 25. 
In addition, "Fannie Mae" has announced that it 00 
longer will buy conventional mortgages from lending in thoH 
eleven states which judicially or statutorily have prohibit~ 
enforcement of due-on-sale provisions. Instead, it only will 
purchase loans which carry a provision that the entire loan 
can be called after seven years, with no guarantee of 
refinancing. See, Higher Mortgages, 'Call-In Option' Threate;. 
Homebuyers, Industry, The Salt Lake Tribune, Nov. 8, 1980 at 
C-6. This !'!leans that all new home buyers will be faced with 
the threat of increased rates and payments in seven years, 
whereas if they had conventional mortgages with enforceable 
due-on-sale clauses, they would be assured of a fixed month!;· 
payment for as long as they owned their homes. 
Future borrowers should not be forced to bear the 
risks of increased rates or of an inability to finance home 
purchases. These risks can be avoided by allowing lenders, 
including Western Savings, to enforce the due-on-sale provi-
sions of loan agreements into which borrowers, including 
appellants, freely entered. 
c. Enforcement Of The Due-On-Sale Clause In This 
Case Is Equitable. 
Not only is the enforcement of the due-on-sale 
clause reasonable, as discussed above, but it also is 
equitable in this case to allow an upward adjustment of the 
interest rate pursuant to the loan agreement. This is so 
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because: (1) if the interest rate had gone down, appellants 
could have refinanced their property at the lower rate; (2) 
under the doctrine of laches, appellants are barred from 
challenging the due-on-sale clause, since they waited more 
than three and one-half years to object to its provisions; 
(3) under the doctrine of "unclean hands," appellants are 
barred from challenging the due-on-sale clause because of 
their demonstrated bad faith and secretive actions evidenced 
by their concealment of the transfer of the property; and (4) 
this case involves investment rather than residential 
property, as discussed, infra. 
If the interest rate had decreased after appellants 
took their loan from Western Savings, they could have 
refinanced their property pursuant to the Trust Note, and 
prepaid the loan from Western Savings, thereby incurring some 
prepayment expense. If appellants had refinanced with 
Western Savings, it was its policy not to charge a prepayment 
fee. But if the appellants had gone elsewhere to refinance 
their property at lower rates, Western Savings would have 
been bound by the terms of the Trust Note and would not have 
realized any long-term revenue anticipated in making the 
loan. Now, however, when interest rates have gone up rather 
than down, appellants argue they should not be bound by the 
terms of their agreement with Western Savings. In other 
words, appellants contend that Western Savings should bear 
all the risks. If interest rates go down, appellants should 
be able to refinance at the lower rate; and if interest rates 
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go up and if appellants sell their property, Western Savi~s 
should not be able to adjust the loan rate to account for 
that increase. This is an inequitable proposal, particular!; 
where, as here, the appellants agreed to and Western Savings 
relied on the provisions of the loan documents which allowed 
western Savings to either accelerate the loan in the eve~ ~ 
sale or else increase the interest rate of the loan to the 
new buyer who assumes the loan. 
It is crucial to note that appellants for more tha: 
three and one-half years did not challenge the due-on-sale 
clause. Appe~lants neither objected to that provision when 
they executed the Trust Deed, Trust Note, and "Acknowledgrnen: 
of Trust Deed Acceleration Clauses" nor contested that provi-
sion at any time during the following three and one-half 
years. Appellants obviously viewed their loan arrangements 
as economically beneficial to them for that period, but now, 
because they have sold the property and interest rates are 
higher, they are seeking any way possible to avoid their 
obligation under the due-on-sale provision. In effect,~ 
are asking this Court for a reformation of the contract. It 
is patently inequitable for them first to obtain and for 
three and one-half years receive the benefit of the loan 
agreement, which included the due-on-sale provision, and no•, 
after selling the property, seek to challenge and evade that 
provision. 
Not only did appellants wait for such an uncon-
scionably long period before objecting to the due-on-sale 
-20-
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provision, they were not honest enough to inform Western 
Savings of their conveyance of the property. Instead, they 
deliberately concealed the transfer and avoided informing, 
confronting or negotiating with Western Savings. Where the 
appellants so obviously are motivated by bad faith and have 
engaged in inequitable conduct, they are not entitled to the 
relief they seek in this appeal. 
Lastly, even the California courts, the decisions 
of which are cited extensively in Appellants' Brief, have 
held that it is reasonable and equitable to enforce the 
due-on-sale clause where the subject property is investment 
property. See, Medovoi v. American Savings and Loan Ass'n., 
89 Cal. App. 3d 875, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 587 (1979). 
Similarly, because this case involves investment property--a 
24-unit apartment complex--the-due-on-sale clause should be 
enforced and the decision of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
D. Western Savings Has The Statutory Right To 
Enforce The Due-On-Sale Clause. 
Federally-chartered savings and loan associations 
are governed by federal regulation and are specifically 
authorized to enforce due-on-sale clauses: 
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association 
continues to have the power to include, as a matter 
of contract between it and the borrower, a 
provision in its loan instrument whereby.the. 
association may, at its option, declare i~e~ia~ely 
due and payable sums secured by the association s 
security instrument if all or any part of the real 
property securing the loan is sold or. trans~erred by the 
borrower without the association's prior written 
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consent. . . . (E] xercise by the association of such 
option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall ~ 
exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract 
and all rights and remedies of the association and ' 
borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract. 
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) 
The effect of this regulation is to enable 
Utah's federally-chartered savings and loan associations to 
increase the yield of their mortgage portfolios, consequent],, 
permitting them to remain profitable and offer new loans at 
the lowest possible rates. 
The Utah Legislature has insured that 
state-chartered savings and loan associations in Utah shall 
be competitive with those which are federally-chartered. 
This was accomplished by enactment of Sections 7-7-5.1 and 
7-13-74, Utah Code Annotated. 
Section 7-7-5.1 provides that "any savings and loar. 
association may make any loan ... which such 
association could make were it incorporated as a federal 
savings and loan association ... 
Section 7-13-74 further provides that any state-
chartered savings and loan association: 
shall have, in addition to all rights, powers, 
privileges, benefits and immunities presently 
possessed, all additional rights, powers, 
privileges, benefits and immunities now or hereafter 
possessed by federal chartered savings and loan 
associations . . . unless and until the 
commissioner of the department of financial 
institutions of Utah shall, by regulation, 
disapprove of any additional right, power, 
privilege, benefit or immunity, thus acquired. 
The Utah Legislature thus has authorized Utah's 
state-chartered savings and loan associations to offer t~ 
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same kinds of loans as federal associations. Accordingly, 
Utah law authorizes state associations to enforce due-on-sale 
provisions such as the one in the agreements between Western 
Savings and the appellants. 
The Utah Legislature has not "[subordinated] its 
regulation of state [associations] to all present and 
future regulations adopted by the federal bureaucracy," as 
appellants contend. (Appellants' Brief at 31.) On the 
contrary, Section 7-13-74 specifically provides that the 
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions may, 
by regulation, prevent state associations from enforcing the 
same provisions that a federal association could enforce. 
The Commissioner, however, has not ruled that state-chartered 
savings and loan associations may not enforce due-on-sale 
clauses. Therefore, Utah law permits Western Savings to rely 
upon and enforce the due-on-sale clause contained in its 
agreement with appellants. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED BY THE LOWER COURT. 
In response to appellants' complaint, Western 
Savings, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, filed a motion to dismiss. Further, pursuant to Rule 
12(b), western Savings presented matters outside the com-
plaint, specifically, an affidavit from Sterling Thomas, 
Assistant Vice-President of Western Savings, and all the 
relevant documents from appellants' loan file. Accordingly, 
the lower court properly treated the motion as one for 
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summary judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. During the course of the hearing upon the moti~ 
to dismiss, the lower court considered the complaint, the 
motions and memoranda, arguments of counsel and the evidence 
consisting of the relevant documents and affidavits. Based 
on the foregoing, the lower court granted summary judgment ir 
favor of Western Savings. 
Pursuant to the standards enunciated in Rule 56(c), 
the lower court correctly entered summary judgment which th1: 
Court should affirm because: ( 1) there are no material facts 
in dispute; ( 2 · no material facts were disputed before the 
lower court; therefore, appellants are now barred from 
contesting the findings of fact; and ( 3) Western Savings was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
A. There Are No Material Facts In Dispute; 
Therefore, The Lower Court Properly Entered Summary 
Judgment. 
The relevant, material, undisputed and dispositive 
facts in this case are: 
(1) In order to finance their investment in a 
24-unit apartment complex, appellants borrowed $108,000 from 
Western Savings and freely executed the Trust Deed, Trust 
Deed Note, and Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration 
Clauses now at issue. 
(2) Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed required 
appellants to notify Western Savings if they transferred an 
interest in the property. 
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(3) On or about September 25, 1979, appellants 
violated the trust deed by selling their interest in the 
property without informing Western Savings. 
(4) Paragraph 29 also provided that if the pro-
perty was sold, Western Savings could accelerate the balance 
of the note or, if Western Savings waived that right and 
allowed the loan to be assumed, the appellants would have to 
agree to an increase in the interest rate of that loan. The 
appellants have refused to comply with this term of the 
agreement. 
In sum, the court found that the appellants are 
investors, who acknowledged they understood the agreement 
they entered, but who nevertheless deliberately breached it 
and then attempted to hide their violation from Western 
Savings. Based on these facts, the lower court concluded 
that there was no reason in law or equity not to enforce the 
agreements reached between Western Savings and the 
appellants. 
The above-stated material facts are not in dispute 
and were not disputed in the lower court; however, in an 
effort to avoid the lower court's summary judgment, 
appellants now attempt to raise a litany of phantom issues of 
disputed material fact. These so-called issues of fact, 
however, are either (a) issues of law, or (b) are not 
disputed, or (c) were immaterial to the lower court's 
decision. 
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Appellants' first purported issue of fact relates 
to the interpretation of the due-on-sale clause. Contrary ~ 
appellants' assertions, Paragraph 29 of the Trust Deed 
specifically grants Western Savings the right to accelerate 
the balance of the loan upon transfer of the property or 
increase the interest rate of the note if the loan is 
assumed. See, page 2, supra. 
Further, contrary to appellants' assertions, there 
is no contradictory language between the Trust Deed and Trust 
Deed Note. The Trust Deed Note specifically incorporates by 
reference the terms of the Trust Deed and provides for the 
acceleration of the note for violation of the terms of the 
Trust Deed. There is no dispute that the appellants violated 
the terms of the Trust Deed and, consequently, Western 
Savings, pursuant to the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, 
properly accelerated the balance of the loan. Additionally, 
this Court previously has held that a note and security 
instrument, though separate documents, are not to be con-
strued separately, but together, and that they constitute a 
single contract. An acceleration provision in the Trust Deed 
operates upon the note, the same as upon the Trust Deed 
itself, and matures the note for all purposes. See, American 
Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 293, 
445 P.2d 1 (1968). 
Contrary to appellants' first purported issue of 
fact, the lower court did examine the contract language. 
That language is clear, and granted Western Savings the righ' 
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to accelerate the loan after the appellants failed to have 
their new buyers assume the loan at a higher interest rate. 
Therefore, there was no dispute regarding the language of the 
acceleration clause, which in any event is an issue of law 
and not of fact. 
Appellants' second purported issue of fact relates 
to the "fact" that the Trust Deed Note does not specifically 
include the acceleration clause. Again, as previously dis-
cussed, the Trust Deed Note provided that the note would be 
accelerated for violation of the terms of the Trust Deed, 
thereby incorporating the provisions of the deed into the 
note itself; and these two documents must be read together. 
This also is an issue of law and not of fact. 
Appellants' third purported issue of fact relates 
to the circumstances surrounding the appellants' signing of 
the documents. The subjective intent of the parties is 
irrelevant unless the language of the contract provisions are 
ambiguous. See generally, Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 
548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1976); Shattuck v. Precision-Toyota, 
Inc., 566 P.2d 1322, 1334 (Ariz. 1977); Johnson v. 0-Kay 
Turkeys, Inc., 392 P.2d 741, 743 (Okla. 1964). Here, the 
language of the documents clearly gives Western Savings the 
power and authority to enforce the due-on-sale clause. 
Moreover, any argument that appellants did not understand 
Paragraph 29 would be a sham in light of appellants' 
endorsements of the Acknowledgment of Trust Deed Acceleration 
Clauses. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact 
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regarding the circumstances of appellants' execution of the 
documents now at issue. 
Appellants' fourth purported issue of fact relates 
to the justifications for the due-on-sale clause. Appellan~' 
contention is without merit. First, these arguments are im-
material to the lower court's decision, which centered upon 
the agreements themselves, the appellants' knowledge of thes: 
agreements, and the appellants' inequitable conduct. Second, 
even if the justifications for enforcement of the due-on-sal: 
clause were material to the lower court's decision, the 
effects of the elimination of the due-on-sale clause are oot 
in dispute. Following the Wellenkamp decision, California 
savings and loan associations instituted variable rate 
mortgages and other mortgage alternatives. From the 
perspective of persons seeking new loans, these alternatives 
are inferior to conventional fixed-rate loans because of 
their higher rates or shorter durations. See pages 12 to 
16, supra. Furthermore, as demonstrated by "Fannie Mae's" 
latest pronouncements requiring seven-year "call back" 
mortgages in those states striking down the due-on-sale 
clause, the effects on the secondary market are as real as 
the effects in the primary market. See, pages 16 to 18, 
supra. These facts are not in dispute and have been 
recognized by numerous authorities. 
Appellants' fifth purported issue of fact is 
related to their fourth issue and pertains to the necessity 
of adjusting mortgage portfolios toward current rates. 
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Again, this issue was not material to the lower court's 
decision, which was based upon appellants' inequitable 
conduct and their breach of an express agreement. 
Additionally, this requirement has been discussed and relied 
upon by the authorities cited above, which recognize that 
savings and loan associations must raise the yield on their 
loan portfolios whenever they are faced with increased costs 
of obtaining new money. 
Appellants' sixth purported issue of fact is that 
no evidence was presented to distinguish residential from 
commercial or investment property transactions. Appellants' 
contention is without merit because: (1) they offered no such 
evidence and thus are barred from raising that issue on 
appeal; (2) as the lower court noted, appellants are 
investors, who understood and deliberately breached their 
agreement with Western Savings; and (3) even the California 
courts permit enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in cases 
involving investment property. See, ~· Medovoi v. 
American Savings & Loan Ass'n, supra. 
Appellants' seventh purported issue of fact is that 
no evidence was presented to establish the public policy 
considerations involved in the case. Appellants' contention 
is without merit because: (1) they offered no such evidence 
and thus are barred from raising that issue on appeal and (2) 
all of the relevant cases briefed and argued to the lower 
court continued an analysis of the public policy considera-
tions involved in a judicial decision whether or not to 
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permit enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. Compare, ~. 
occidental savings & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, supra, 
and Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, supra. See also, the 
lower court's Conclusion of Law No. 1. 
Appellants' eighth purported issue of fact is that 
no evidence was presented to determine whether enforcement o' 
a due-on-sale clause constitutes an unreasonable restraint o: 
alienation. This contention is without merit because the 
matter is an issue of law which was briefed and argued to fo 
lower court. (Con cl us ion of Law No. 1. ) 
Appellants' ninth purported issue of fact is that 
no evidence was presented to establish that Western Savings' 
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause does not work a penalt 
or forfeiture. This contention is without merit because: 11 
the appellants presented no evidence to the contrary and 12: 
the matter is an issue of law. (Conclusion of Law No. 2.) 
See, ~, Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 545 P.2d at 549. 
Appellants' tenth purported issue of fact is that 
no determination was made whether a foreclosure pursuant to' 
due-on-sale clause should be treated as a mortgage 
foreclosure. Obviously, this matter is an issue of law a~ 
is wholly immaterial to the lower court's conclusion that 
"Under the above facts of this case, the 'due on sale' cla~ 
before the court is a legal, valid, and enforceable contrac: 
provision. (Conclusion of Law No. 2.) 
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Appellants' eleventh purported issue of fact is 
that no determination was made about the effect of 
due-on-sale clauses upon economic considerations involved in 
property transactions. Appellants' contention is without 
merit because: (1) they offered no such evidence and thus are 
barred from raising that issue on appeal and (2) the issue is 
immaterial to the lower court's decision herein. 
Appellants' twelfth purported issue of fact is that 
no evidence was presented to establish the effect upon 
lenders if due-on-sale clauses are ruled unenforceable. 
Appellants' contention is without merit because: (1) Western 
Savings by affidavit established the adverse effects upon 
lenders; (2) appellants failed to rebut this evidence; and 
(3) as demonstrated, supra, at pages 11 to 14, such adverse 
effects upon lenders are well recognized. 
Appellants' thirteenth purported issue of fact is 
that no finding was made whether a due-on-sale clause is an 
appropriate way to control interest rates. Appellants' 
contention is without merit because: (1) they offered no such 
evidence nor requested such a finding and thus are barred 
from raising that issue on appeal and (2) the issue is 
immaterial to the lower court's decision herein. 
Appellants' fourteenth purported issue of fact is 
that the lower court failed to state or clarify the 
applicability of Sections 7-7-5.1 and 7-13-74, Utah Code 
Annotated. Appellants' contention is without merit because: 
!l) this matter is an issue of law and (2) appellants never 
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requested the lower court to make such a statement or 
clarification in its conclusions of law. 
B. The Appellants' Purported Issues Of Material. 
Fact Were Not Disputed In The Lower Court; Therefore 
Appellants Are Barred From Raising Such Issues On Appeal. 
Appellants made no attempt in the lower court to 
raise any issue of disputed material fact as they should ha~ 
done pursuant to Rule 56, if they were to avoid summary 
judgment. 
Western Savings provided the relevant loan docu-
ments and the affidavit of Sterling Thomas in order to 
establish the undisputed facts justifying enforcement of the 
due-on-sale clause in this case. Accordingly, Western 
Savings' motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for 
summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56. Rule 
56(e) provides: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
The appellants offered no evidence to raise any 
issue of material fact before the lower court; none of their 
affidavits or exhibits were offered to contest nor did they 
contest facts established by Western Savings. Furthermore, 
appellants did not even submit an affidavit pursuant to Rule 
56 ( f) explaining why they could not obtain facts to dispute 
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western Savings' evidence. Obviously, they failed to do so 
because the relevant, material and dispositive facts are not 
in dispute, i.e., they knowingly entered into an express 
agreement and three and one-half years later breached that 
agreement and deliberately tried to conceal that conduct from 
western Savings. 
Because the appellants failed to demonstrate that 
there was any issue of disputed material fact before the 
lower court, that court properly entered surrunary judgment and 
its decision should be affirmed. 
C. Western Savings Was Entitled To Judgment As A 
Matter Of Law. 
Based on the undisputed facts and substantial 
authority, the lower court properly held Western Savings was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under the facts of 
this case, as the lower court concluded, the due-on-sale 
clause is not a restraint on alienation. Its elimination 
would create the burden of even higher interest rates for 
those who seek new loans in the future. Enforcement of the 
due-on-sale clause provides the greatest amount of loan 
money at the lowest possible rate. The Utah Legislature has 
authorized state-chartered savings and loan associations to 
enforce due-on-sale clauses. Such enforcement in this case 
is proper because of the appellants' acknowledgement of the 
acceleration clause, because of their inequitable conduct and 
because this case involves investment rather than residential 
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property. Based on the foregoing, the decision of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
III. WESTERN SAVINGS HAS THE CONTRACTUAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO FORECLOSE THE PROPERTY 
PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED. 
As a "last resort" argument, appellants contend 
that if Western Savings is allowed to foreclose the proper~ 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed, the redemption 
period should be six months rather than three months. 
{Appellants' Brief at 33-35.) This argument is without 
merit. 
Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Trust Deed specificall;· 
grant Western Savings the right, upon appellants' default on 
any agreement in the Trust Deed, to accelerate the remaining 
balance and cause the trustee to execute a written notice of 
default and sell the property, pursuant to the laws of Utah, 
to satisfy outstanding obligations. 
Section 57-1-23, Utah Code Annotated, authorizes 
the trustee to sell the subject property for breach of an 
obligation under the Trust Deed: 
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the 
trustee which the trustee may exercise and under 
which the trust property may be sold in the manner 
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an 
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed 
as security. . • (Emphasis added.) 
Pursuant to Section 57-1-31, Utah Code 
Annotated, appellants have three months to prevent the 
foreclosure sale by curing the default which necessitated 
such action: 
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Whenever all ..• of the principal sum of any 
obligation secured by a trust deed has ..• been 
declared due by reason of a breach or default in 
the performance of any obligation secured by the 
trust deed ..• at any time within three months of 
the filing for record of notice of default under 
such trust deed, if the power of sale is to be 
exercised .•. [the truster] may pay the beneficiary 
the entire amount then due under the terms of such 
trust deed and the obligation and trust shall be 
reinstated . . . as if no such acceleration had 
occurred. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellants have several possible courses of 
action, and are not limited, as they argue in their brief, to 
paying the entire balance within three months, although that 
is one option. A second option is for them to rescind their 
sale of the property, and pay all costs and fees, thereby 
curing the default caused by the sale of the property. A 
third option is for them to pay all costs and fees and do 
that which Western Savings has always sought to have them 
do--have the new buyers assume the loan at the increased 
interest rate available at the time of the transfer of the 
property. 
Therefore, although a foreclosure sale of the 
property could take place pursuant to Utah law in the event 
this Court affirms the trial court's decision, appellants 
have several other options available to them to avoid that 
result. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that appellants will not receive as much 
for their investment property as they would prefer, is not 
good reason to strike down the due-on-sale clause. On the 
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contrary, enforcement of that clause: (1) does not work an 
unreasonable restraint upon al iena ti on; ( 2) is reasonable; 
(3) is equitable; and (4) is authorized pursuant to Utah 
law. 
Based on the foregoing, the lower court properly 
entered summary judgment, and its judgment should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ~ay of December, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard W. Giauque 
James R. Holbrook 
Stephen T. Hard 
Giauque, Holbrook, Bendinger 
& Gurrnankin 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt 4~;1'!.l~Oe..•1--
::torney' ~ 
Defendant-Respondent 
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